Saturday, November 24, 2012
Tuesday, November 20, 2012
Muftah » The Conflict in the Gaza Strip: the Rhetoric of Hypocrisy & Illogic
Muftah » The Conflict in the Gaza Strip: the Rhetoric of Hypocrisy & Illogic
My thoughts on Evangelical Zionists, "pro-Palestine" racists, hypocrisy on civilian life, legitimate violence and the impotence of the Arab League. And other fun things.
My thoughts on Evangelical Zionists, "pro-Palestine" racists, hypocrisy on civilian life, legitimate violence and the impotence of the Arab League. And other fun things.
Sunday, November 18, 2012
As if censorship -- & vaginas -- were anything new.
Walks in the Park, Shutting up, or : Buy me a Ball-Gag.
Flashbacks to some old "art"-ish things. In light of Yusef's request for (the memory) of my actual art stuff from back-in-the-day, and articles too "inflammatory" to publish, I'll just call it a day and give you some other fun memories of censorship.
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<--------2001 show, before I gave up the tattooing, gave up the painting and started focusing on writing. Bugs are fine.
<--------- 2001 show. This was in the box in the middle (you know, the one with "painting removed" in the sign above). It was not fine. Vaginas. Freaking you out since, well, forever.
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This one wasn't so popular either. From a 2002 show. "Photojournalistic Ethics (?)" - it got ripped down from the exhibition (only) four times. I still don't understand why it's so offensive to look at this iteration. Isn't the reality far more upsetting?
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Seth Depiesse reconfiguring (in chalk) the original photograph by the both of us. This is from his show (I think around 2007?). The original photograph was in an exhibition of mine from 2004, but was destroyed by a happy-go-lucky-audience member. ----------------------------------------------->
Reviving a long-dead (mostly deleted) "blog" on the request of one Mr. Yusef Ben-Masaud
I received this message last night, which -- damn, if it didn't get me thinking :)
"BTW where is your blog? ... You are roaming around my blood’s
back yard all the time and all I get from you are short statements on politics
and current events. I know your busy but come on when do I get to read an
article, a poem, see a doodle from you? I don't care if it is once a month, I
want to experience the nuisanced emotion your pulling out from over
there....I'm stuck is boringville Colorado for the time being, and I can still
find nonacademic things that occasionally need pause and reflection. Just
saying. Do it.I'm not asking for a collection of political articles. I'm asking
for personal stories of interaction with sights, smells, and sounds. I'm
holding you to it. I'm even going to give you an deadline if you want to take
it, New Years."
New Year's? Seriously ya Akhi?
Hijacking Libya : a Tale of two ideologues
--Preface--
This was submitted to a Middle East / North Africa journal (that
shall remain nameless) a few months back, and was subsequently deemed too
"inflammatory" for publication. So I'll just put it here instead.
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Libya’s revolution has, indeed, been hijacked
–not by Taliban-styled Salafi radicals, or by the tentacles of insidious
Western imperialism, but by ideologues eager to project pre-packaged hypotheses
(be it democratization towards the utopia of secular modernity or entrenchment
in global neo-liberalism with conservative fascism proves the rule of the
day). The July 7th elections
have broken the wave of Islamists surging to power in the wake of the Arab
Spring. With the announcement that the liberal Alliance
Coalition has taken a strong
lead, rather than the much-discussed and terribly feared “Eastern Al-Qaeda
hordes,” it seems many commentators will (or should) be forced to eat
their words. The misguided assumptions and faulty predictions concerning
Libya result from a conjunction two primary factors: Gaddafi’s purposeful
isolation of Libya and subsequently, the black hole of information concerning
the nation’s history and internal political dynamics.
For example, the “tribal thesis,” as Johnny West
terms it, is often invoked to explain Libyan politics, and makes “great hunting
ground for the opportunist expert. Lean the names of a few tribes and where
Gaddafi is from and you’re good for a three-minute talking head slot on most of
the major news channels” (2011: 289). West’s sardonic comment here proves
applicable to Libyan history on a general level. Of the controversies
surrounding the 2011 Libyan revolution, perhaps the most tragic is the
hijacking of Libya – not by Qatar, in a shady alliance with Mossad,
neo-liberals, the United States (insert Russia Today’s favorite villain du
jour, or the White House’s eagerness to claim credit for any positive
developments in North Africa and the Middle East), but rather, by ideologues
with little to no background on the country. Gaddafi’s intentional isolation of
the nation for such an extended period of time has, in the aftermath of the
revolution, created, in many ways, an intellectual black hole: any conspiracy
theorist or regional theorist seems entitled to project onto the country a host
of preconceived notions neatly tailored to his or her ideological outlook. It
is not a question of Libya, but a question about Libya: these are two very different
things. Consequently, this is not a book review about the books, but a
discussion about the broader trend they represent.
An academic colleague recently asked me to
compile a bibliography on the Libyan revolution. He sought, however,
theoretical assessments of the conflict that have yet to be produced—owing,
again, to the pre-revolution difficulty of obtaining in-depth knowledge of
Libyan history and internal politics. Extant texts on the Libyan
revolution run the spectrum from the accounts of parachute journalists, relying
heavily on sensationalist , or the rare, well-researched and straightforward
accounts of journalists with
in-depth experience of the country on
the ground. I discuss here two publications typical of the divergent
and predominant “thought” on the Libyan revolution—selected specifically for
the ways in which respective authors assume ideologically-opposed frames of
reference, yet mirror one another in emblematic ways of assumptions on
Libya. Vijay Prashad’s Arab
Spring, Libyan Winter and
Bernard Henri-Levy’s La
Guerre Sans l’Aimer are
useful texts- not for anything they teach us about the Libyan conflict itself –
but rather, as a symbol of the role which the Libyan Revolution has come to
play in public political discourse. In neither case does the reader
achieve an understanding of realities on the ground, local opinions, the
emotions of a people in struggle-- it is never a question of Libya but about Libya—a key and critical difference.
Vijay Prashad has amassed a wealth of support
among leftist intellectuals, due in no small part to copious
publications on subaltern
studies, the failures of capitalism and global imperialism. Although Prashad is
a respected voice on South Asia, his publications on the Arab Spring –and
Libya, more specifically—begin to appear in Counterpunch, a website that defines
itself as “muckraking with a radical attitude.” Counterpunch’s other
Libya “experts” have included Franklin Lamb, whose curriculum vitae cannot seem
to be found – anywhere. A stroll through Prashad’s credentials is
instructive, and perfectly in keeping with Arab
Spring, Libyan Winter. The text opens with an assessment of the Arab
Uprisings, in which Prashad lauds the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions against
a background of dire predictions for the future of post-Gaddafi Libya.
Leaving aside the fact that the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes lost figureheads,
but managed to retain the structural underpinnings of their former autocracies,
Prashad’s declarations seem a bit hasty, to say the least. Yet it is with
his revelations on the plans of the “Atlantic Powers” and the “Arab NATO” that
the true thesis of the text emerges.
The initial section of Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is heavily weighted towards a
discussion of Egyptian history, and a cursory gloss of other, regional
uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, and the winds of discontent in Syria. In
Prashad’s view, the supposed authenticity of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions
derives from the popular nature of mass uprisings, a claim which belies his
fundamental ignorance of North African nations’ political dynamics. As
the dust from Ben Ali and Mubarak departures has settled, Tunisia and Egypt
much more closely resemble military coups than “revolution,” properly-speaking.
Libya, however, according to Prashad, started out with the best of
intentions, yet was taken over by expatriate neo-liberal Libyans colluding with
the shadowy forces of imperialism. I’ve written elsewhere about the high cost
paid by expatriate
Libyans, and won’t belabor the point here; nonetheless, Prashad’s
dismissive comments on the nature of the opposition to Gaddafi constitute a
recurrent theme throughout the text, and reveal a stunning ignorance to the
level of neo-imperialist machinations behind the scenes in Gaddafi’s Libya,
under the heir-apparent Saif al-Islam.
Prashad focuses on Libya after ninety pages of
“Arab Spring” background. Although his thesis that the United States and the
Gulf Powers colluded to crush the Bahrain uprising is certainly valid, his
discussion of Libya is riddled with inaccuracies—from his initial mention of
the country. The author paints Saudi Arabia as desperate to suppress
Bahraini opposition, and nearly joyful about the distractions provided by Libya
and Syria (89). He then begins to describe the uprising in Libya, which,
according to Prashad, broke out in March (90). Be it a faulty fact-checker or a
real lack of knowledge, the inaccurate chronology is a serious breach in the
thesis’ credibility. Libya rose up on February 15, two days in advance of
the planned Day of Rage on February 17. Syria, however, was slower to
erupt: not until did the arrest of a group of young boys for spraying
anti-Assad graffiti prompt demonstrations to spread and regime crackdowns—in
mid-March, a mere few days before the United Nations resolution on the Libyan
intervention. Moreover, Prashad appears to lack an understanding of the
basic structures and dynamics of Gaddafi’s Libya–quite understandable, given
the regime’s self-conscious isolation. The author portrays not only
“tribal Libya,” but what he calls the ultimate weak-point of Gaddafi and
company’s strategy: underestimating the “ultimate tribe of the regime, the army
(112).” This provides another fundamental inaccuracy in Prashad’s
account: Gaddafi’s Libya lacked a traditional military structure; hence, the difficulty
with integrating various militias we’ve seen in the past several months.
Rather, the paranoid “Brother Leader” created a splintered military structure
with various, unconnected brigades—in order to prevent an army coup from
toppling him.
In short, Prashad’s assessment of Libya is
riddled with inaccuracies that betray not only a lack of in-depth knowledge
concerning the country under Gaddafi (and before) but also betray ideological
convictions all too easily projected onto the intellectual void, the blank
space of an unknown nation. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, we
find Bernard Henri-Levy, the supposedly expired-type known as a “public
intellectual.” Levy’s La Guerre sans l’aimer : Journal d’un écrivain au cœur du printemps
libyen (2011) constitutes a steadfast argument in favor of the international
intervention –which, if we are to fully credit the author, he nearly entirely
orchestrated. For all his self-congratulation, the French philosopher’s book is
a journal recounting his “feelings” on the country—about which he admittedly
knew nothing in advance. It is a text which makes no claims to predict Libya’s
future, or to present an analytical assessment of the conflict. It is,
rather, the ramblings of a self-important writer, evidenced in the documentary
format as well: Levy has even produced and starred in a
documentary – not about Libya, of course, but about his
role in the uprising. La Guerre sans l’aimer spans the course of the entire
revolution, yet remains self-consciously recounted through the eyes of the
author. Levy recounts and ruminates on his condescension towards the Libyan
people, depicting the Transitional National Council as meek and seemingly
awestruck in his presence. The reader is carried along as Levy marches
down the Benghazi Corniche, directing rebels to remove anti-Semitic graffiti
and giving speeches on women’s rights to gathered crowds. Insufferable and paternalist,
decidedly. However, at least he’s honest.
From one side, it’s Levy’s insufferable harangues
about the compatibility of religion and democracy and the fear of political
Islam, and from the other, Prashad’s deconstruction of insidious “Atlantic
Powers” and “Arab NATO” plots moving in the darkness, pulling strings from
behind the scenes. Because Libya was ignored by the outside for so long –much
of this originating in Gaddafi’s own isolationist policies—it is a convenient
and simple slate on which to project imperialist fantasies : by thinkers on
both the left and right. The sad truth about Libya under Gaddafi : one
had to care. Those who did not had plenty of company—not many on the
international scene and in the academy did. Did Libyans live through a
stunningly brutal historical legacy—from Italian fascist occupation, corruption
under the Idrissid monarchy, the false-promises of Gaddafi’s 1969 coup and his
slide into full-throttle despotism, and so much more—only to see a courageous
uprising hijacked? The leftist discourse of Prashad is no less paternalistic
than the condescending democratization rhetoric it supposedly seeks to combat.
You see, Libyans, it doesn’t matter that the vast majority take pride in the
February 17th Revolution,
and are thrilled with the electoral process and its outcome. Nor does it
matter that your population, in an unprecedented move, begged for the
imposition of a No-Fly Zone: for intellectuals of all stripes, it seems “We in
the West (still) know best.”