Hijacking Libya : a Tale of two ideologues

--Preface--

This was submitted to a Middle East / North Africa journal (that shall remain nameless) a few months back, and was subsequently deemed too "inflammatory" for publication. So I'll just put it here instead.

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Libya’s revolution has, indeed, been hijacked –not by Taliban-styled Salafi radicals, or by the tentacles of insidious Western imperialism, but by ideologues eager to project pre-packaged hypotheses (be it democratization towards the utopia of secular modernity or entrenchment in global neo-liberalism with conservative fascism proves the rule of the day).  The July 7^th elections have broken the wave of Islamists surging to power in the wake of the Arab Spring. With the announcement that the liberal Alliance Coalition has taken a strong lead, rather than the much-discussed and terribly feared “Eastern Al-Qaeda hordes,” it seems many commentators will (or should) be forced to eat their words. The misguided assumptions and faulty predictions concerning Libya result from a conjunction two primary factors: Gaddafi’s purposeful isolation of Libya and subsequently, the black hole of information concerning the nation’s history and internal political dynamics. 

For example, the “tribal thesis,” as Johnny West terms it, is often invoked to explain Libyan politics, and makes “great hunting ground for the opportunist expert. Lean the names of a few tribes and where Gaddafi is from and you’re good for a three-minute talking head slot on most of the major news channels” (2011: 289).  West’s sardonic comment here proves applicable to Libyan history on a general level. Of the controversies surrounding the 2011 Libyan revolution, perhaps the most tragic is the hijacking of Libya – not by Qatar, in a shady alliance with Mossad, neo-liberals, the United States (insert Russia Today’s favorite villain du jour, or the White House’s eagerness to claim credit for any positive developments in North Africa and the Middle East), but rather, by ideologues with little to no background on the country. Gaddafi’s intentional isolation of the nation for such an extended period of time has, in the aftermath of the revolution, created, in many ways, an intellectual black hole: any conspiracy theorist or regional theorist seems entitled to project onto the country a host of preconceived notions neatly tailored to his or her ideological outlook. It is not a question of Libya, but a question about Libya: these are two very different things.  Consequently, this is not a book review about the books, but a discussion about the broader trend they represent.

An academic colleague recently asked me to compile a bibliography on the Libyan revolution.  He sought, however, theoretical assessments of the conflict that have yet to be produced—owing, again, to the pre-revolution difficulty of obtaining in-depth knowledge of Libyan history and internal politics.  Extant texts on the Libyan revolution run the spectrum from the accounts of parachute journalists, relying heavily on sensationalist , or the rare, well-researched and straightforward accounts of journalists with in-depth experience of the country on the ground.  I discuss here two publications typical of the divergent and predominant “thought” on the Libyan revolution—selected specifically for the ways in which respective authors assume ideologically-opposed frames of reference, yet mirror one another in emblematic ways of assumptions on Libya.  Vijay Prashad’s Arab Spring, Libyan Winter and Bernard Henri-Levy’s La Guerre Sans l’Aimer are useful texts- not for anything they teach us about the Libyan conflict itself – but rather, as a symbol of the role which the Libyan Revolution has come to play in public political discourse.  In neither case does the reader achieve an understanding of realities on the ground, local opinions, the emotions of a people in struggle-- it is never a question of Libya but about Libya—a key and critical difference.

Vijay Prashad has amassed a wealth of support among leftist intellectuals, due in no small part to copious publications on subaltern studies, the failures of capitalism and global imperialism. Although Prashad is a respected voice on South Asia, his publications on the Arab Spring –and Libya, more specifically—begin to appear in Counterpunch, a website that defines itself as “muckraking with a radical attitude.”  Counterpunch’s other Libya “experts” have included Franklin Lamb, whose curriculum vitae cannot seem to be found – anywhere.  A stroll through Prashad’s credentials is instructive, and perfectly in keeping with Arab Spring, Libyan Winter.  The text opens with an assessment of the Arab Uprisings, in which Prashad lauds the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions against a background of dire predictions for the future of post-Gaddafi Libya.  Leaving aside the fact that the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes lost figureheads, but managed to retain the structural underpinnings of their former autocracies, Prashad’s declarations seem a bit hasty, to say the least.  Yet it is with his revelations on the plans of the “Atlantic Powers” and the “Arab NATO” that the true thesis of the text emerges. 

The initial section of Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is heavily weighted towards a discussion of Egyptian history, and a cursory gloss of other, regional uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, and the winds of discontent in Syria.  In Prashad’s view, the supposed authenticity of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions derives from the popular nature of mass uprisings, a claim which belies his fundamental ignorance of North African nations’ political dynamics.  As the dust from Ben Ali and Mubarak departures has settled, Tunisia and Egypt much more closely resemble military coups than “revolution,” properly-speaking.  Libya, however, according to Prashad, started out with the best of intentions, yet was taken over by expatriate neo-liberal Libyans colluding with the shadowy forces of imperialism. I’ve written elsewhere about the high cost paid by expatriate Libyans, and won’t belabor the point here; nonetheless, Prashad’s dismissive comments on the nature of the opposition to Gaddafi constitute a recurrent theme throughout the text, and reveal a stunning ignorance to the level of neo-imperialist machinations behind the scenes in Gaddafi’s Libya, under the heir-apparent Saif al-Islam.

Prashad focuses on Libya after ninety pages of “Arab Spring” background. Although his thesis that the United States and the Gulf Powers colluded to crush the Bahrain uprising is certainly valid, his discussion of Libya is riddled with inaccuracies—from his initial mention of the country.  The author paints Saudi Arabia as desperate to suppress Bahraini opposition, and nearly joyful about the distractions provided by Libya and Syria (89).  He then begins to describe the uprising in Libya, which, according to Prashad, broke out in March (90). Be it a faulty fact-checker or a real lack of knowledge, the inaccurate chronology is a serious breach in the thesis’ credibility.  Libya rose up on February 15, two days in advance of the planned Day of Rage on February 17.  Syria, however, was slower to erupt: not until did the arrest of a group of young boys for spraying anti-Assad graffiti prompt demonstrations to spread and regime crackdowns—in mid-March, a mere few days before the United Nations resolution on the Libyan intervention.  Moreover, Prashad appears to lack an understanding of the basic structures and dynamics of Gaddafi’s Libya–quite understandable, given the regime’s self-conscious isolation.  The author portrays not only “tribal Libya,” but what he calls the ultimate weak-point of Gaddafi and company’s strategy: underestimating the “ultimate tribe of the regime, the army (112).”  This provides another fundamental inaccuracy in Prashad’s account: Gaddafi’s Libya lacked a traditional military structure; hence, the difficulty with integrating various militias we’ve seen in the past several months. Rather, the paranoid “Brother Leader” created a splintered military structure with various, unconnected brigades—in order to prevent an army coup from toppling him.

In short, Prashad’s assessment of Libya is riddled with inaccuracies that betray not only a lack of in-depth knowledge concerning the country under Gaddafi (and before) but also betray ideological convictions all too easily projected onto the intellectual void, the blank space of an unknown nation. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, we find Bernard Henri-Levy, the supposedly expired-type known as a “public intellectual.”  Levy’s La Guerre sans l’aimer : Journal d’un écrivain au cœur du printemps libyen (2011) constitutes a steadfast argument in favor of the international intervention –which, if we are to fully credit the author, he nearly entirely orchestrated. For all his self-congratulation, the French philosopher’s book is a journal recounting his “feelings” on the country—about which he admittedly knew nothing in advance. It is a text which makes no claims to predict Libya’s future, or to present an analytical assessment of the conflict.  It is, rather, the ramblings of a self-important writer, evidenced in the documentary format as well: Levy has even produced and starred in a documentary – not about Libya, of course, but about his role in the uprising. La Guerre sans l’aimer spans the course of the entire revolution, yet remains self-consciously recounted through the eyes of the author. Levy recounts and ruminates on his condescension towards the Libyan people, depicting the Transitional National Council as meek and seemingly awestruck in his presence.  The reader is carried along as Levy marches down the Benghazi Corniche, directing rebels to remove anti-Semitic graffiti and giving speeches on women’s rights to gathered crowds. Insufferable and paternalist, decidedly. However, at least he’s honest.

From one side, it’s Levy’s insufferable harangues about the compatibility of religion and democracy and the fear of political Islam, and from the other, Prashad’s deconstruction of insidious “Atlantic Powers” and “Arab NATO” plots moving in the darkness, pulling strings from behind the scenes. Because Libya was ignored by the outside for so long –much of this originating in Gaddafi’s own isolationist policies—it is a convenient and simple slate on which to project imperialist fantasies : by thinkers on both the left and right. The sad truth about Libya under Gaddafi : one had to care. Those who did not had plenty of company—not many on the international scene and in the academy did. Did Libyans live through a stunningly brutal historical legacy—from Italian fascist occupation, corruption under the Idrissid monarchy, the false-promises of Gaddafi’s 1969 coup and his slide into full-throttle despotism, and so much more—only to see a courageous uprising hijacked? The leftist discourse of Prashad is no less paternalistic than the condescending democratization rhetoric it supposedly seeks to combat. You see, Libyans, it doesn’t matter that the vast majority take pride in the February 17^th Revolution, and are thrilled with the electoral process and its outcome.  Nor does it matter that your population, in an unprecedented move, begged for the imposition of a No-Fly Zone: for intellectuals of all stripes, it seems “We in the West (still) know best.”